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Princeton University
By the time Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, many employers had created maternity leave programs. Ana-
lysts argue that they did so in response to the feminization of the
workforce. This study charts the spread of maternity leave policies
between 1955 and 1985 in a sample of 279 organizations. Sex dis-
crimination law played a key role in the rise of maternity leave poli-
cies. Building on neoinstitutional theory, this article explores how
the separation of powers shapes employer response to law. Details
of the law are often speciﬁed in administrative rulings—the weakest
link in the law because they can be overturned by the courts and
by Congress. Yet an administrative ruling requiring employers with
disability leave programs to permit maternity leave, which employ-
ers successfully fought in the courts, was at least as effective as the
identical congressional statute that replaced it. In the American con-
text, thelegal vulnerability of administrative rulings can draw atten-
tion to them, thus making the weakest link in the law surprisingly
powerful.
INTRODUCTION
In the ﬁrst debate of the 1996 presidential campaign, Bob Dole (Washing-
ton Post 1996, p. A12) argued that Congress should not have used the
“long arm of the federal government” in 1993 to force employers to offer
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parental leaves. Most employers were already providing maternity leave
in response to the growing ranks of women workers, Dole argued. Busi-
ness leaders had made the same point in ﬁghting the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993. James A. Klein, the manager of employee
beneﬁts for the United States Chamber of Commerce, argued: “There is
a growing sense, as the demographics of our work force change, that pa-
rental leave is a good beneﬁt to have. . . . A recent Bureau of National
Affairs survey showed that 90% of companies grant maternity leave. . . .
We think that’s terriﬁc, so long as it’s voluntary” (quoted in Pear 1985,
p. 16). In a letter to the Washington Post, the Small Business Association
stated: “In the absence of any government mandate . . . between 74 and
90 percent of all businesses are already addressing the problem” (Jasinoski
1991, p. 3C).
It is true that employer treatment of maternity had changed before pas-
sage of the FMLA in 1993. In the late 1950s, only 5% of those in our
sample of medium and large employers offered maternity leave; by 1985,
over half offered it. In the late 1960s, many corporations still required
pregnant women to resign; by the late 1970s, few did so (Fryburger 1975).
Many women took advantage of these changes in employer policy. In the
early 1960s, only one-sixth of employed women who bore children took
leaves; by the mid-1980s fully half were taking leaves (O’Connell 1990).
Employers created maternity leave programs in the 1970s and 1980s,
but not as a “voluntary” response in “the absence of any government man-
date,” as politicians, business leaders, and scholars have argued. Employ-
ers responded to three kinds of government mandates. First, in 1972, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that employ-
ers who allowed leaves for disabling medical conditions must allow them
for maternity. Failure to do so constituted sex discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. As early as 1973, a survey (Bender 1973, p. 61)
found that 58% of large employers had responded with new maternity
leave policies. Second, in 1978, after the Supreme Court overturned the
EEOC ruling, Congress passed a statute codifying the 1972 EEOC re-
quirements. Third, some states went a step further. California required
employers to allow job-guaranteed maternity leaves, regardless of their
temporary disability policies.
We show that these legal changes had a profound, if little-recognized,
inﬂuence on workplace maternity leave (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Dobbin
and Sutton1998). Most students of maternity leave programs neglect these
policies, in some cases because they use cross-sectional data that make it
hard to observe the effects of legal changes (Glass and Fujimoto 1995;
Goodstein 1994; Ingram and Simons 1995; Milliken, Martins, and Morgan
1998). But eventhose who focus on the legalenvironment tend to overlook
early maternity leave law. Ruhm and Teague (1997, p. 133) argue, “Prior
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to 1993 there was no federal law requiring U.S. employers to offer parental
leave,” despite the fact that 1972 and 1978 laws required many employers
to offer maternity disability leaves and pay (see also Klerman and Liebo-
witz 1997). Like Bob Dole and the Chamber of Commerce, most scholars
discount the role of public policy and privilege the role of the labor market
when explaining employers’ leave policies.
We build on neoinstitutional studies that explore why Americans see
business practices that are driven by public policy as driven by market
forces (Fligstein 1990, 1996; Dobbin and Sutton 1998). Americans tend to
underestimate the importance of policy in part because the federal gov-
ernment appears to be weak. We argue that one basis of the federal gov-
ernment’s perceived weakness, the separation of powers, can produce a
peculiar sort of policy efﬁcacy. In separating governing powers, the Con-
stitution is thought to weaken the state by making administrative and
case law and, to a lesser extent, legislation susceptible to legal challenges.
History has created a natural laboratory that allows us to examine the
relative efﬁcacy of an administrative ruling and a parallel, subsequent,
congressional statute. Our ﬁndings challenge the conventional wisdom
that administrative regulations are ineffective when their legal standing
is uncertain. Because the 1972 EEOC ruling was contested in court, and
ultimately because the administrative branch’s authority to make law is
tenuous, the ruling won press attention that popularized maternity leave
policies. Yet perhaps because the ruling was struck down by the Supreme
Court, politicians and scholars have failed to recognize its effects.
We also provide what we believe to be the ﬁrst test of the relative efﬁ-
cacy of equal opportunity and afﬁrmative action laws in changing em-
ployer practices, and here our ﬁndings conﬁrm the conventional wisdom
that afﬁrmative action laws are more effective. We test these hypotheses
about the effects of public policy in the context of competing hypotheses
about female labor force participation and about employer sensitivity to
the risk of legal sanction. Like Bob Dole and the Chamber of Commerce,
most labor economists assume that employers adopted maternity leave in
response to the growing feminization of the workforce. We look at the
effects of industry feminization and trends in feminization. Students of
law and regulation, on the other hand, argue that employers comply with
the law when the risk of legal sanction is high. We compare the effects of a
contestedadministrativerulingofuncertainlegalstandingwiththoseofan
uncontested congressional statute. We also operationalize the risk of legal
sanction with a measure of federal lawsuits dealing with maternity leave.
Thefeminizationandlegalsanctionhypothesesfarepoorlyinouranalyses.
Our analysis relies on data from a stratiﬁed random sample of Califor-
nia, New Jersey, and Virginia employers. After charting the history of
maternity leave law and deriving hypotheses about the effects of changes
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in the law, we review theories that suggest rival hypotheses. We then
modeltheadoption ofmaternity leave policiesin a sampleof 279 organiza-
tions, 148 of which established formal leave policies between 1955 and
1985. We look at the adoption of written maternity leave policies, which
guarantee that a worker can return to her job, or to a similar job, after
being away from work due to pregnancy, childbirth, or infant care.2
TRANSLATING LAW INTO ORGANIZATIONAL RULES
Classical organizational theorists paid scant attention to the role of the
state in shaping the behavior of organizations. Neoinstitutional theorists
have remedied this, showing that a variety of contemporary organiza-
tional features had their origins in public policy. Fligstein (1990) shows
that antitrust amendments encouraged ﬁrms to adopt the conglomerate
form. Roy (1997) shows that the modern private corporation inherited the
structure of the 19th-century, public-purpose corporation. Baron, Dobbin,
and Jennings (1986) show that World War II labor market regulations
encouraged ﬁrms to develop personnel systems. Before these neoinstitu-
tional studies, the role of the state had faded in scholarly accounts of cor-
porate attributes, arguably because antistatist sentiments led Americans
to articulate market rationales for all corporate practices.
Neoinstitutionalists have sought to understand the central paradox of
U.S. business regulation—how a seemingly weak state can shape corpo-
rate practice. While some theorists had described the relationship between
the state and organizations as “coercive” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983),
empirical studies found that the U.S. state often inﬂuences corporate be-
havior without using a clear, coercive mandate. Neoinstitutionalists ﬁrst
explored why ﬁrms respond to ambiguous legislation. They found that
ambiguous federal laws could produce elaborate compliance activities
among organizations uncertain of what is required of them. Ambiguity in
legislation leads ﬁrms to invent compliance measures on their own, to be
tested by the courts (Edelman 1992; Dobbin et al. 1993). The measures
they invent feed into the next round of statute making (Carruthers and
Halliday 1998, p. 45). Professional groups—lawyers and personnel man-
agers—turned legal ambiguity into a professional asset, by exaggerating
the risk of litigation to win corporate resources (Edelman et al. 1992) and
by lobbying executives to create extensive, legalistic personnel systems
(Sutton and Dobbin 1996).
2 Over the past 40 years, maternity leave has been linked to disability leave, sick leave,
parental leave, and family leave. We consider policies covering maternity to be mater-
nity leave policies, regardless of the label used.
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The Paradox of Administrative Law
Our primary theoretical goal is to explore the effects of another apparent
weakness of the U.S. state, the separation of powers. The separation of
powers permits all three branches of government to make law, but it also
opens the laws made by each branch to challenge. Congress writes laws,
often using abstract language that demands interpretation. Federal agen-
cies then interpret the law, issuing regulations that begin to deﬁne compli-
ance. The courts can rule against these regulations on the grounds that
they are inconsistent with legislation or with constitutional law. Affected
parties often challenge administrative and judicial rulings, and free riders
often await ﬁnal disposition of the challenges brought by their peers. Con-
gress also has the power to write laws that directly address case law and
administrative law, validating some interpretations of previous statutes
and overruling others. In short, case law trumps administrative law, and
legislation trumps everything but the Constitution.
Most see the separation of powers as weakening the state, because it
renders federal edicts vulnerable to legal challenge and reversal. It makes
administrative law particularlyvulnerable. Scholars of law and regulation
from both left and right (Sunstein 1996; Posner 1997) suggest that corpo-
rate responsiveness to the law is a function of the risk of sanction. The
likelihood of sanction in the federal courts is greater in the case of congres-
sional acts than in the case of administrative law, because legislation is
less susceptible to legal challenge and reversal. It follows that, all else
being equal, legislation should be more effective than administrative law
at changing employer practices.
The history of early maternity leave law sheds light on the process by
which law—both statutes and administrative rulings—are translated into
organizational practices. With the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress out-
lawed sex discrimination in employment. The EEOC, established to ad-
minister the law, at ﬁrst deﬁned sex discrimination narrowly. In 1972, it
expanded the deﬁnition to include pregnancy discrimination. That deﬁni-
tion was successfully challenged in court by General Electric and was
then revived by Congress in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.
We use this historical sequence to assess the relative efﬁcacy of adminis-
trative law. We compare the contested administrative ruling with the vir-
tually identical congressional act that replaced it. Both the 1972 ruling
and the 1978 act required employers to treat pregnancy-related disability
on par with other short-term disabilities—to offer leaves and pay for preg-
nancy if they offered them for other medical conditions. Despite the fact
that it was overturned by the Supreme Court, the 1972 EEOC ruling was
surprisingly effective at changing employer policies.
We argue that in the United States, where employment law is enforced
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reactively through litigation rather than proactively through administra-
tive scrutiny, employers respond to the visibility of new laws and the per-
ceived risk of litigation rather than to the objective risk of legal sanction.
Press attention to legal battles increases the perceived risk of sanction, in
part because it increases the visibility of the law and in part because nega-
tive publicity is a potent sanction itself. In other words, employment law
may work through such informal sanctions as bad press as well as through
such formal sanctions as costly litigation (Suchman and Edelman 1996;
McCann 1998). Thus litigation and press coverage can serve to promul-
gate a new federal edict, even when the goal of the litigation is to over-
turn the edict. Paradoxically, then, administrative rulings may elicit
organizational response because they are inherently susceptible to court
challenges.
Afﬁrmative Action versus Equal Opportunity Laws
Our second goal is to examine the relative effectiveness of equal opportu-
nity and afﬁrmative action laws. Equal opportunity laws require employ-
ers to treat all employees equally, regardless of characteristics such as sex,
race, and religion. Afﬁrmative action law, as Kennedy and Johnson de-
ﬁned it, encourages positive efforts to improve opportunities for disadvan-
taged groups (see Skrentny 1996). Activists within the Civil Rights and
women’s movements have long debated the merits of afﬁrmative action
in employment. While many contend that it improves opportunities for
disadvantaged groups, others contend that it smacks of “special treat-
ment” and thus lacks the legitimacy conferred by the 14th amendment’s
language of equal protection.
Few previous studies have explored the efﬁcacy of afﬁrmative action
laws in the realm of employment. Early labor market studies showed that
employers coveredby afﬁrmativeaction law were morelikely to addblack
men to their payrolls than were employers covered only by equal opportu-
nity law (Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Leonard 1984). Like the authors
of these early labor market studies, we compare two groups of employers:
one exposed to an equal treatment provision and the other exposed to
both that provision and an afﬁrmative action law. The federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 required equal treatment of pregnancy and
other disabling medical conditions. California’s 1978 “afﬁrmative action”
maternity law additionally required employers to offer job-guaranteed
maternity leave. We ﬁnd that the afﬁrmative action law had a signiﬁcant
net effect.
Next, we chronicle the evolving treatment of pregnancy under sex dis-
crimination law, developing hypotheses about the effects of three different
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policy approaches. We then review competing theories of employer mater-
nity leave provision before turning to our central analysis.
THE LAW AND MATERNITY LEAVE
We examine the effects of three laws to make two critical comparisons.
First, we examine two substantively similar laws: a contested administra-
tive ruling and an uncontested congressional act. We compare employer
response to the EEOC guidelines of 1972 and the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act of 1978. Second, we examine two substantively different laws:
an equal treatment law requiring employers to match maternity beneﬁts
to disability beneﬁts and an afﬁrmative action law requiring all employers
to offer maternity leave. We compare employers subject to the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 with those additionally subject to California’s
1978 amendments to its Fair Housing and Employment law.
Before Maternity Leave Laws
Before the early 1970s, the American state did little to promote maternity
leave (Kamerman, Kahn, and Kingston 1983). During World War II, the
Department of Labor’s Women’s Bureau recommended that employers
guarantee the jobs of women who were absent due to pregnancy and ma-
ternity. But most employers continued to require pregnant women to re-
sign from their jobs (Frank and Lipner 1988, p. 15; Silverman 1943). The
Equal Pay Act of 1963 required employers to pay men and women the
same wages for the same work, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed
employment discrimination based onsex. However, neither act mentioned
maternity or pregnancy. In 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), created to administer the employment provisions
(Title VII) of the Civil Rights Act, stated that providing “truly equal em-
ployment opportunities” meant guaranteeing the jobs of women who were
absent from work due to maternity and childbirth (EEOC 1966, p. 40).
Yet the EEOC also told employers that it was not illegal to exclude mater-
nity from disability leave programs (Vogel 1993, pp. 64–65).
Employers felt little pressure to offer maternity leave in the years after
the passage of the Civil Rights Act. A 1967 study of large employers, con-
ducted by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), found that 18% still
required pregnant employees to resign (BNA 1967, p. 20). The vice presi-
dent of the First National Bank of Cincinnati pointed to the EEOC’s
ambivalence in explaining his company’s resignation policy: “It is my un-
derstanding that while the EEOC favors the concept of maternity leaves,
it has not agreed to a policy statement. Until such time, I shall follow my
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former policy” (quoted in BNA 1967, p. 20). During the 1960s, civil rights
legislation did little to encourage employers to offer maternity leave.
The 1972 EEOC Ruling: Promulgation by Litigation
In March of 1972, the EEOC issued new Guidelines on Discrimination
because of Sex that deﬁned pregnancy discrimination as an element of
sex discrimination. Employers could not refuse to hire, train, or promote
a woman because of pregnancy (29 Code of Federal Regulations 1604
[1972]). Neither could they ﬁre a woman because of pregnancy. The guide-
lines also directed employers to treat pregnancy-related disabilities as they
treated other disabilities that keep workers away from their jobs for short
periods. Employers who provided leaves, health insurance, or income re-
placement for nonoccupational injury and illness were required to do the
same for pregnancy-related disabilities. The EEOC guidelines also sug-
gested that employers who failed to allow leaves for pregnancy-related
disability were guilty of discrimination, unless they could prove a business
necessity for forbidding leaves.
Using theEEOCguidelines,the EEOCandunions sued employers over
their maternity leave beneﬁts. Employers fought back by charging that
the EEOC guidelines were an illegal deviation from Congress’s intent in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC’s targeted lawsuits produced a
great deal of publicity for the new maternity leave regulations. The guide-
lines were effective, paradoxically, because as administrative law they
were vulnerable to reversal by the courts; when employers fought the new
regulations, they helped generate even more publicity for the issue of ma-
ternity leave. The EEOC apparently recognized this when they initiated
suits against high-proﬁle employers, seeking both a favorable Supreme
Court ruling and publicity for the guidelines. While the Supreme Court
overturned the guidelines in 1976, many employers who followed the legal
contest did not wait for the standing of the guidelines to be clariﬁed.
The women’s movement and the EEOC regulations.—We show below
that after the EEOC ruling, employers were more likely to create mater-
nity leave programs. Some might argue that the law was merely a mediat-
ing force and that the women’s movement pressured the EEOC and em-
ployers to change their maternity leave policies. Did the women’s
movement prompt the EEOC ruling and employers’ adoption of mater-
nity leave? We now take a brief detour to answer this question. First, we
note that scholars of the women’s movement give feminists within the
federal government a central role in stimulating the women’s movement
(see Harrison 1988; Costain 1992). Kennedy’s Commission on the Status
of Women gave rise to state-level commissions, and it was at a 1966 con-
462Maternity Leave Policies
ference of these commissions that feminists encouraged Betty Friedan to
found the National Organization for Women (NOW) as an external lob-
bying body (Harrison 1988, chap. 9; Costain 1992, pp. 44–45; Skrentny,
in press). Second, by the early 1970s, NOW and other women’s move-
ments groups were functioning autonomously, but they were not concen-
trating on federal maternity leave policy. At this time, NOW was busy
lobbying states for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and lobbying
the EEOC to end discrimination in job advertising.
Instead, it was the federal Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of
Women (successor to Kennedy’s Commission) that led the charge to
change federal policy on maternity leave. The Council developed sample
maternity leave policies for federal employees, pressed the EEOC for a
ruling on maternity leave, and provided the language for the 1972 mater-
nity leave guidelines (Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of Women
1971, 1973; Vogel 1993, pp. 62–65). The historical evidence suggests that
feminists within the federal government lobbied for the maternity leave
ruling, which later led employers to change their practices.
The EEOC guidelines and employer response.—Contemporaneous
studies showed that large employers responded quickly to the new EEOC
regulations. A Prentice Hall study of 108 large employers found that more
than half were at least considering new maternity leave policies in the
wake of the EEOC’s guidelines (Hyatt 1972, p. 20). EEOC Commissioner
Ethel Bent Walsh reported in 1974 in the Labor Law Journal that over
three-fourths of banks and insurance companies had liberalized their ma-
ternityleave policiesand beneﬁts“asa directresult of [EEOC]Guidelines”
(Walsh 1974, pp. 153–54). One study found that between 1972 and 1975,
two-ﬁfths of employers made major changes in their maternity leave poli-
cies (BNA 1975). Another found that the number of ﬁrms offering mater-
nity leave nearly tripled between 1969 and 1978 (Kamerman et al. 1983,
p. 56). We hypothesize that employers responded to the EEOC’s new posi-
tion with new maternity leave policies.
Hypothesis 1.—In the wake of the EEOC guidelines, employers were
signiﬁcantly more likely to create maternity leave policies.
Legal challenges to the EEOC ruling.—After the EEOC issued the 1972
guidelines, the Commission began a legal campaign against large, high-
proﬁle employers. Some of these employers, notably General Electric,
challengedtheEEOC’s interpretation of Title VII. TheG.E.case (General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert et al., 97 Sup. Ct. 401 [1976]) dealt directly with
disability insurance (i.e., income replacement) during leaves but drew at-
tention to the wider issue of maternity leave. Using the EEOC guidelines,
the United Electrical Workers union initiated a class action suit, in which
they claimed that G.E.’s disability beneﬁts program discriminated against
463American Journal of Sociology
pregnant women. General Electric argued that the EEOC’s interpretation
of Title VII as covering pregnancy ran counter to the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act.
Before the Supreme Court’s 1976 ruling in favor of G.E., both the Dis-
trict Court of Virginia and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that G.E. had discriminated against pregnant em-
ployees (Fryburger 1975). These decisions created modest ﬁnancial sanc-
tionsandtremendousnegative publicity for thecompany. In April of1974,
district court judge Robert Merhige ruled that G.E. must treat pregnancy
as it treats other temporary disabilities: “To isolate such a disability for
less favorable treatment in a scheme purportedly designed to relieve the
economic burden of physical incapacity is discrimination by sex” (quoted
in National Underwriter 1974, p. 4). G.E. had argued that because preg-
nancy is voluntary, it is not like other disabilities. The court found that
because G.E. does not exclude any other disabilities, they cannot exclude
pregnancy-related disabilities: “That this is sex discrimination is self-evi-
dent” (quoted in National Underwriter 1974, p. 4). The court of appeals
upheld this decision in 1976.
Late in 1976, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions in
the G.E. case, ruling that employers who treat pregnancy differently from
other nonoccupational disabilities are not guilty of sex discrimination. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, for the Court, argued that excluding a condition from dis-
ability leave and beneﬁt coverage as “a subterfuge to accomplish a forbid-
den discrimination,” in this case against women, would be illegal if the
condition were similar to covered conditions. But pregnancy is “not a ‘dis-
ease’ at all, and is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition”
(General Electric Co. v. Gilbert et al., 9). The Court rejected Judge Mer-
hige’s position that maternity should be treated like cosmetic surgery,
which is voluntarily undertaken, and like sports injuries, whichoccur dur-
ing recreational activities that carry known risks. The G.E. challenge
seemed to have succeeded in the courts, but the notoriety it brought en-
couraged employers to add maternity leave policies.
Press coverage as the mediating force.—The EEOC’s announcement
of the guidelines produced a brief burst of press attention, but legal chal-
lenges generated the ongoing publicity that brought the EEOC’s position
to the attention of most employers. The 1972 guidelines made the ﬁrst
page of the New York Times (March 31, 1972), the sixth page of the Wall
Street Journal (April 3, 1972), and the tenth page of section three of the
Los Angeles Times (April 1, 1972). The New York Times reported that,
“In its most sweeping revision of its guidelines on discrimination because
of sex since they were ﬁrst adopted in 1966, the employment commission
now says that to deny a woman a job because she is pregnant is, on its
face, aviolation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . . In addition, disabilities
464Maternity Leave Policies
related to pregnancy, including recovery from childbirth, miscarriage, and
abortion, should be treated by employers the same as any other temporary
disability in terms of leave” (New York Times 1972, p. A1).
In April of 1974, the New York Times reported that in the two years
since the EEOC’s guidelines were issued, the commission had sued 11
large employers for maternity discrimination, with 111,052-employee du
Pont at the top of the list. In reporting on these suits, the Times warned,
“Just as women have always know that it is impossible to be ‘a little bit
pregnant,’ so the nation’s employers are learning—from the Federal Gov-
ernment—that it is imprudent to be a little bit prejudiced against a preg-
nant employee” (Dullea 1974, p. 41). Specialist journals also advised em-
ployers to add maternity leave. Harry Edwards argued in the Labor Law
Journal in 1973 (p. 421), “reinstatements after childbirth will probably
be required unless the employer can show that there is some compelling
‘business necessity’ which justiﬁes a refusal to reinstate.” Business Week
reported that after the district court’s decision in the G.E. case in April
of 1974, the EEOC ﬁled 130 pregnancy discrimination suits and issued
warnings to another 250 companies. The union that fought the case
against G.E. soon brought charges against another 73 employers, and
Business Week (1976, p. 41) noted that “Companies on the ﬁring line in-
clude Westinghouse, RCA, Chrysler, Sperry Rand, Pennwalt, Honeywell,
Philco-Ford, and Phelps Dodge.” Given the prominence of the EEOC
guidelines and pursuant lawsuits at the time, it is striking that a quarter-
century hence, politicians, managers, and scholars have forgotten the role
of the state in popularizing maternity leave.
The G.E. case and related litigation received much more press coverage
than the original guidelines had. While the adoption of the guidelines mer-
ited one or two articles in each major daily paper we examined, the G.E.
case was the subject of 20 New York Times articles between 1972 and
1976 and was covered widely in the pages of Business Week, Fortune,
and Forbes. The district court and court of appeals decisions of 1974 and
1976, backing the guidelines, received particularly extensive coverage.
Figure 1, which charts New York Times articles on maternity leave issues
from 1970 to 1984, illustrates this. There was a dramatic rise in the num-
ber of articles in 1972, the year that saw the issuance of the EEOC guide-
lines and the initiation of the G.E. case. The number of articles remained
high for the course of the litigation.
We hypothesize that early lawsuits generated publicity about the new
regulations and so led employers to install maternity leave programs, de-
spite the fact that the lawsuits challenged the validity of the EEOC ruling.
Press coverage mediated the effects of lawsuits. Figure 2 shows that in
our sample, the proportion of ﬁrms with maternity leave policies rose dra-
matically between 1974 and 1977. Compare this with ﬁgure 1, which
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Fig. 1.—New York Times articles on maternity leave
shows press coverage of maternity leave. While it is important to exercise
caution in interpreting ﬁgure 2, because changes over time may simply
result from changes in covariates such as size, thecorrespondence between
ﬁgures 1 and 2 during this period is suggestive. It appears that press cover-
age stimulated employers to adopt maternity leave. There were few suits
Fig. 2.—Percentage of employers with maternity leave
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in these early years, thus, as we argue below, employers responded to
publicity rather than to the actual risk of being sued.
Hypothesis 2.—Press coverage of maternity leave regulations in-
creases the likelihood an employer will adopt maternity leave policies.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978: Congress’s Equal
Protection Mandate
After the Supreme Court struck down the EEOC ruling in 1976, Congress
responded by writing the EEOC position into law in the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act (PDA) of 1978. The PDA gives us the opportunity to com-
pare the effects of an administrative ruling with those of a similar congres-
sional act. The PDA amended the Title VII deﬁnition of “discrimination
because of sex” to include discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.” Like the EEOC ruling, the act de-
pended on the principle of equal protection to require employers to treat
women affected by pregnancy “the same for all employment-related pur-
poses” as other persons “similar in their ability or inability to work”
(United States Code 42: 2000e[k] [1994]). Employers would have to extend
disability leaves and pay to cover pregnant women.
Employers did not challenge the PDA in court as they had challenged
the EEOC guidelines, and as a consequence, the PDA received little press
coverage. G.E. had argued that the EEOC’s 1972 ruling misinterpreted
congressional intent. Employers had no grounds to challenge the 1978
statute because Congress had made its intent clear therein. After a brief
burst of press coverage, the PDA received little attention. While there had
been 109 New York Times articles on maternity leave between 1972 and
1978, there were just 43 between 1979 and 1984 (see ﬁg. 1). Most of those
focused on new state and local maternity leave regulations.
Before 1978, the legal standing of the EEOC ruling was uncertain. Sev-
eral courts found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act required employers
with disabilitybeneﬁts to offer matching maternity beneﬁts. ButG.E. con-
tinued to ﬁght the case, and the Supreme Court found that Title VII re-
quired no such thing. Students of law and regulation predict that when
a ruling is challenged in the courts, ﬁrms will delay compliance and await
a resolution. If employers had awaited a ﬁnal decision, then we would
expect to see a slow increase in maternity leave policies after the EEOC
ruling, followed by a rapid increase after the PDA. Instead, we expect
that wide press coverage of G.E.’s challenge of the EEOC ruling led many
employers to create maternity leave programs before the PDA settled the
legal issue. Under our scenario, adoption rates would be high in the mid-
1970s. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act may have led ﬁrms to liberalize
existing maternity leave programs (Vogel 1993) and encouraged feminists
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to ﬁght for broader family leave laws (Elving 1995), but we expect that
the law spawned few new corporate maternity leave programs. In resolv-
ing the legal issue, the PDA had the effect of curtailing public discourse
on maternity leave.
It is important to note that studies of the spread of other corporate equal
opportunity practices do not ﬁnd a slowdown during the 1980s, after the
Reagan administration reduced enforcement of Civil Rights laws. Em-
ployers continued to adopt afﬁrmative action ofﬁces (Edelman 1992; Dob-
bin and Sutton 1998), formal grievance procedures to intercept discrimi-
nation complaints (Sutton et al. 1994; Sutton and Dobbin 1996), and
formal hiring and promotion practices to prevent discrimination by mid-
dle managers (Dobbin et al. 1993). Yet we predict that publicity sur-
rounding the G.E. case had led most employers who monitor the legal
environment to install maternity leave policies by the late 1970s. A con-
tested administrative ruling had caused susceptible employers to change
their practices, so the new statute had limited effects.
Hypothesis 3.—Because many employers established maternity leave
programs following the EEOC guidelines of 1972, we expect that the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act will have little effect on employer adoption of
maternity leave programs.
California’s Maternity Leave Legislation of 1978: The Afﬁrmative
Action Approach
Some states went a step further than Congress, requiring all employers
to offer job-protected maternity leave. California, in a 1978 amendment
to the state Fair Employment and Housing Act (California Government
Code 12945 [1998]), required employers with 15 or more workers to allow
women to take maternity leaves. Unlike the PDA, the California law did
not state that maternity leave provisions should match disability leave
beneﬁts. Instead it required all but the smallest of employers to allow job-
guaranteed maternity disability leaves of up to four months, regardless of
their treatment of other disabilities. For example, even if an employer only
held a worker’s job for four weeks after a heart attack, the employer
would be required to hold a woman’s job for 16 weeks if she was unable
to work because of pregnancy or recovery from childbirth. Whereas the
PDA was based on the principle of equal opportunity, the California law
was based on the principle of afﬁrmative action—it was designed to im-
prove opportunities for a particular protected group.
While the issue of afﬁrmative action in employment has generated a
great deal of heat, scholarship has as yet generated little light on its rela-
tive efﬁcacy. Previous labor market studies have compared sectors subject
to equalopportunity law to those additionally subjectto afﬁrmativeaction
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law (Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Leonard 1984). Black men made
bigger inroads in the latter group than in the former. We employ a similar
method to examine the effects of these two approaches on employer prac-
tices.
We hypothesize that California’s afﬁrmative action law was more effec-
tive than the federal equal treatment law. History hasproduced a straight-
forward test. By 1978, the PDA required that maternity leaves and pay
match disability leaves and pay. This law applied to employers in all 50
states. The California employers in our sample were, additionally, re-
quired by that state’s afﬁrmative action law to offer maternity leaves.
Thus, in comparing California employers to those in New Jersey and Vir-
ginia after the 1978 legislation, we have a clear test of the effect of adding
an afﬁrmative action requirement to an equal treatment requirement.
Like theEEOC regulations, the California lawreceived somepress cov-
erage upon passage and more attention during the course of legal chal-
lenges. A Los Angeles Times editorial encouraged passage in August of
1978, and an article in the same paper announced passage on September
30, 1978. Employers challenged the law in 1982, claiming that it conﬂicted
with the equal treatment principle of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 107 Sup. Ct.
683 [1987]). In the 1987 Supreme Court decision upholding the California
law, Thurgood Marshall argued that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
was intended to create “a ﬂoor beneath which pregnancy disability bene-
ﬁts may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise” (quoted
in Vogel 1993, p. 88; see also Rhode 1989). The case received considerable
national coverage; ﬁve of the New York Times articles on maternity be-
tween 1982 and 1984 (see ﬁg. 1) covered it.
Feminists held different positions on the wisdom of the afﬁrmative ac-
tion approach, and the public debate helped to make employers aware of
the California law (Gorney 1984; Rhode 1989). Some feminists opposed
what they derogatorily referred to as the “special treatment” approach of
the California law, drawing comparisons to paternalist legislation from
the turn of the century that had limited women’s employment opportuni-
ties (see Kessler-Harris 1982; McCammon 1996). Many mainstream orga-
nizations that had fought for gender equality—the National Organization
of Women, the League of Women Voters, the National Women’s Political
Caucus, and the American Civil Liberties Union—sided with California
employers in opposing that state’s law (Vogel 1993, p. 78). These groups
advocated the approach that would later become law in the Family and
Medical Leave Act, of guaranteeing leaves to new fathers as well as new
mothers. When the United States District Court overturned California’s
maternity leave law in 1984, Dianne Feinstein, San Francisco’s Demo-
cratic mayor, praised the court, arguing, “What we women have been
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Fig. 3.—Percentage of employers with maternity leave by state
saying all along is we want to be treated equally. Now we have to put
our money where our mouth is. What we were asking was to create a
special group of workers that in essence is pregnant women and new
mothers. I just don’t happen to agree with that” (UPI 1984, p. 5). Others
argued that because women bear the brunt of pregnancy, requiring equal
treatment did not do enough to equalize opportunity for women. These
feminists saw California’s law as a more realistic way to help advance
women’s employment opportunities.
We predict that California’s afﬁrmative action law had a net positive
effect on employers. In ﬁgure 3, we present the prevalence of maternity
leave, both over time and by state. By about 1980, the diffusion of mater-
nity leave policies had stalled among New Jersey and Virginia employers
but not among California employers. Others have found that state-level
employment statutes do shape workplace practices (e.g., Guthrie and Roth
1999).
Hypothesis 4.—Following the maternity leave requirements of the
1978 law, employers in California will adopt maternity leave at higher
rates than employers in New Jersey or Virginia.
THEORIES OF FRINGE BENEFITS
The conventional wisdom, as sketched above by Bob Dole and the Cham-
ber of Commerce, comes from labor economists, who suggest that employ-
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ers responded to the growing ranks of women in the labor market with
maternity leave programs. We examine this thesis by looking at industry
feminization and change in feminization. A second important argument
comes from students of law and regulation, who suggest that employers
comply with laws in direct proportion to the risk of sanction. We examine
this thesis by comparing a congressional statute of sure legal standing with
an administrative ruling that was being challenged in the courts. We also
examine the risk of legal sanction with a measure of maternity leave cases
in federal courts.
Quite a few scholars have studied employer work/family policies in
general and maternity leave in particular, although none has studied the
spread of maternity leave over time (Glass and Fujimoto 1995; Goodstein
1994; Guthrie and Roth 1999; Ingram and Simons 1995; Milliken et al.
1998; Osterman 1995). Drawing on these studies, we review other factors
that have affected human resources practices and work/family policies in
particular.
The Feminization Thesis
Labor economists argue that employers use beneﬁts to compete for labor
and tailor beneﬁts to labor market characteristics. A number of analysts
have sought to show that industry feminization predicts employer work/
family beneﬁts. Cross-sectional studies have produced mixed results.
Goodstein (1994) and Osterman (1995) ﬁnd that employers with large
numbers of women are more likely to offer work/family beneﬁts, and
Guthrie and Roth (1999) ﬁnd that employers in industries with large num-
bers of women are more likely to offer paid maternity leave. But Glass
and Fujimoto (1995) found that employers with large numbers of women
are not more likely to have maternity leave, and Ingram and Simons
(1995) ﬁnd that such employers are no more likely to offer an array of
work/family beneﬁts, including maternity leave. Previous cross-sectional
studies have not examined whether trends in feminization matter. If labor
economists are correct, we should ﬁnd that industry feminization predicts
maternity leave adoption and that change in feminization also predicts
adoption.
Hypothesis 5.—Employers in sectors with high proportions of women
workers, and those in sectors where women’s representation is growing,
will adopt maternity leave to compete in the labor market.
The Risk of Sanction Thesis
Students of regulation from both the left and right have made economistic
arguments about how ﬁrms respond to the law. Richard Posner, a founder
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and proliﬁc proponent of the school of law and economics, suggests that
ﬁrms are rational actors when dealing with the law (Posner 1974, 1997).
When faced with a law, they calculate the costs of compliance and non-
compliance. As theriskoflegal sanction increases,soshould thecalculated
cost of noncompliance. Some students of regulation from the left, such as
Cass Sunstein (1990, 1996), advocate a similar approach to the issue of
compliance as well. Agents comply with the law in proportion to the per-
ceived risk of sanction.
Based in economic arguments about behavior, these perspectives sug-
gest hypotheses about employer compliance with maternity leave law.
First, they suggest that employers should have been more likely to create
maternity leave programs after passage of the PDA, which had certain
legal standing, than after the EEOC ruling, which had uncertain legal
standing and was in fact struck down by the Supreme Court.
Hypothesis 6.—Because the legal standing of the EEOC guidelines
was uncertain and the standing of the PDA was not, employers awaited
the latter before creating maternity leave policies.
Second, employers should have adopted maternity leave in direct re-
sponse to the rising risk of being sued. Figure 4, which charts the number
of federal court decisions in maternity leave cases, shows the increased
risk of litigation faced by employers. While a few high-proﬁle lawsuits
dominated the media in the early and mid-1970s, the number of suits was
small. Litigation increased after press coverage rose and remained high
Fig. 4.—Federal court decisions in maternity leave cases
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after the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and during the Reagan era. In his
study of pregnancy discrimination in the United States, Mark Edwards
argues that this litigation led employers to change their maternity leave
practices. He claims litigation “directly forced employers to accommodate
pregnancy in the workplace” (1996, p. 251). We examine whether there is a
direct effect of litigation. Previous studies suggest that the risk of litigation
affected employer maternity leave practices even after passage of the
FMLA. In a study of corporate maternity pay in 1996, Guthrie and Roth
(1999) show that employers in liberal federal circuit court districts are
more likely to offer pay. We test the hypothesis that the risk of litigation
stimulated the spread of maternity leave.
Hypothesis 7.—The risk of litigation, as measure by an annual count
of federal court decisions in maternity leave cases, increases the likelihood
an employer will adopt maternity leave.
Neoclassical and Transaction Cost Economics: Recruitment and
Retention
Economists offer several relevant hypotheses, beyond the feminization
thesis, that concern how employers use fringe beneﬁts to attract and retain
workers. Firms are thought to provide better beneﬁts when labor markets
are tight and when turnover is particularly costly.
There is some evidence that employers are more likely to adopt mater-
nity leave and other family beneﬁts in tight labor markets. Glass and Fuji-
moto (1995) ﬁnd that employers with large numbers of professional and
managerial workers—two groups with low unemployment rates—are
more likely to offer maternity pay but no more likely to offer job-guaran-
teed leaves. Goodstein (1994) and Ingram and Simons (1995) ﬁnd that
industry-level scarcity of female workers leads employers to offer work/
family beneﬁts such as maternity leave, but Osterman (1995) ﬁnds that
employers with recruitment and retention problems are no more likely to
have work/family policies.
Hypothesis 8.—Employers in sectors with low unemployment rates,
and in sectors with declining unemployment rates, will be more likely to
adopt maternity leave.
Labor economists and transaction costs theorists expect employers who
depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, such as those in capital-intensive industries,
to offer beneﬁts that bind workers to the ﬁrm (Doeringer and Piore 1971;
Williamson 1981). Sociologists and economists have found that ﬁrms in
the ﬁnance sector also depend on long-term employment, and these em-
ployers also use personnel practices and fringe beneﬁts to tie workers to
the ﬁrm (Goldin 1986; Baron, Jennings, and Dobbin 1988; Milliken et al.
1998).
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Hypothesis 9.—Industries that value long-term employment will be
more likely to adopt maternity leave policies.
Labor segmentation theorists have made kindred arguments about em-
ployer efforts to retain workers through “bureaucratic control” systems,
which formalize promotion and expand retention-related beneﬁts (e.g.,
pensions and leaves) to encourage workers to stay with the ﬁrm (Edwards
1979; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). Guthrie and Roth (1999) ﬁnd
that employers with formalized personnel systems are more likely to offer
paid maternity leave.
Hypothesis 10.—Employers with formal internal labor market prac-
tices will be more likely to adopt maternity leave.
Neoinstitutional Theory: Professional Groups and Public Visibility
Neoinstitutional studies have established that professionals often deter-
mine corporate response to unclear policy mandates (Edelman et al. 1992;
Sutton and Dobbin 1996, p. 795). Personnel and legal experts have pro-
moted a range of different Civil Rights compliance mechanisms. Beneﬁts
specialists were in charge of leave policies, and so they were most likely
to have monitored legal developments in this area.
Hypothesis 11.—Organizations with personnel, legal, and beneﬁts of-
ﬁces will be more likely to adopt maternity leave policies.
Studies have also shown that public sector and nonproﬁt organizations
are more susceptible to normative pressures regarding fair employment
practices (Meyer and Scott 1983; Dobbin et al. 1988; Edelman 1990). In
an analysis of cross-sectional data from 1991, Ingram and Simons (1995)
conﬁrm that public-sector employers are more likely to offer work/family
beneﬁts, including leaves, dependent care assistance, and ﬂexible work
schedules.
Hypothesis 12.—Public and nonproﬁt organizations will be more
likely than private sector ﬁrms to adopt maternity leave policies.
Industrial Relations: Union Pressure
Unions have historically fought for generous fringe beneﬁt packages
(Freeman 1981; Freeman and Kleiner 1990; Kalleberg and Van Buren
1996), but studies ﬁnd little evidence that unionization is associated with
leave policies (Osterman 1995; BNA 1986). We control for unionization.
Hypothesis 13.—The presence of a union will increase an employer’s
likelihood of adopting maternity leave.
Unions in feminized sectors have often pushed for beneﬁts favored by
women (Milkman 1987, p. 2; Schatz 1983). Glass and Fujimoto (1995)
ﬁnd that unionization and an interaction term between unionization and
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feminization show positive effects on organizational maternity leave, sug-
gesting that unions ﬁght for maternity leave when their members are
women.
Hypothesis 14.—Unionization will have a particularly strong effect
in feminized industries.
Size and Age
Scale should predict the formalization of maternity policies, as it predicts
the formalization of many other policies (Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Kal-
leberg and Van Buren 1996). Most studies show that size has a nonlinear
effect, because an increase of 100 employees has a greater impact on a
ﬁrm of 50 than on a ﬁrm of 1,000.
Hypothesis 15.—Size will have a positive, but declining, effect on the
likelihood employers will adopt maternity leave policies.
Older organizations should be less likely to adopt maternity leave.
Stinchcombe (1965) discovers that organizations ﬁnd it difﬁcult to change
established practices. Selznick (1957) likewise argues that, over time, orga-
nizations become resistant to change.
Hypothesis 16.—Older organizations will be less likely to adopt mater-
nity leave.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
We analyze data collected from a stratiﬁed random sample of public, non-
proﬁt, and private sector establishments in 1985–86. Retrospective data
on the history of each establishment’s personnel policies were collected
from 279 respondents. These respondents were located in three states, se-
lected for their varying legal environments: California, New Jersey, and
Virginia. The sample was stratiﬁed by industry to ensure variety and to
facilitate examination of industry effects. Establishments were sampled
from banking, chemical manufacturing, electrical manufacturing, ma-
chinery manufacturing, publishing, transportation, retail trade, hospitals,
nonproﬁt organizations, and city, county, state, and federal agencies. We
used the best population list available for each group and omitted employ-
ers with fewer than 50 workers and employers who reported that they
did not operate in one of the states or in one of the industries sampled
(Dobbin et al. 1993; Sutton and Dobbin 1996). The survey covered organi-
zational structure and demographics and key employment policies for the
period 1955–85. We obtained a response rate of 48%, but after eliminating
21 responses due to the poor quality of the data, we were left with a net
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rate of 45%. This compares favorably with the response rates obtained
in other organizational studies. Milliken et al. (1998) report a rate of 18%;
Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) report 35%; Blau et al. (1976) report 36%;
Edelman (1992) reports 54%; and the National Organizations Survey for
1991 reports 65% (see Spaeth and O’Rourke 1996, p. 32). We expect that
there is some response bias in the data, in that establishments with person-
nel ofﬁces were probably more likely to participate. As such establish-
ments may be more likely to create maternity leave policies, we suspect
that our over-time plots somewhat overstate the prevalence of maternity
leave. This bias is unlikely to affect the event history analyses, however.
First, the survey includes information on the factor most likely to create
response bias, the presence of a personnel ofﬁce, and, hence, we can in-
clude that factor in the model. Second, we have many organization-by-
year spells without personnel ofﬁces, and so we have adequate variance
on this covariate.
The data were transformed into annual spells, yielding a data set with
4,921 at-risk organization-years. Each annual spell records values for the
outcome and for independent variables for each year. We retained a rec-
ord for each year in which an organization was operating and at risk of
maternity leave adoption. We removed the organization-year spells in
which each organization was not at risk of adopting maternity leave—
those spells before the organization’s birth and those after it had created
a leave policy. Organizations that did not adopt maternity leave before
1986 are included for the whole period. Our analysis relies on the 4,726
at-risk organization-years with complete data for the relevant variables.
Measures and Model Speciﬁcation
Maternity leave policy adoption.—Survey respondents were asked
whether their organization had ever had a formal policy covering mater-
nity leave. As noted above, organizations remain in the risk set until adop-
tion of maternity leave or censoring, in 1985. We do not have information
on whether the leave policies provide pay or on the length of leave. For
organizations with policies, respondents were asked when the policy was
adopted and when, if ever, it was abandoned. Formal policies covering
maternity leave serve as an important resource for women. For the most
part, the policies adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s replaced formal
or informal policies of requiring pregnant workers to resign (Fryburger
1975; O’Connell 1990). The job guarantee fosters career continuity, and
this has positive long-term effects on women’s advancement and income
(Waldfogel 1997; Jacobsen and Levin 1995).
Independent variables.—Table 1 lists the independent variables. These
vary over time, and they were collected at the establishment level unless
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Variables Used in Analysis
Predicted
Variable Description Effect
Organizational characteristics:
Log employment ...................... Natural logarithm of number of employ- 1
ees in previous year
Age ............................................ Years since organization’s founding 2
Banking .................................... Binary variable marking sector—does not 1
change over time
Core manufacturing ................ Chemicals, electrical manufacturing, and 1
machinery manufacturing
Government agencies .............. Federal, state, county, and local govern- 1
ment
Unionization ............................. Binary variable for presence of union con- 1
tract in previous year
Personnel ofﬁce ........................ Binary variable for presence of personnel 1
ofﬁce in previous year
Beneﬁts ofﬁce ........................... Binary variable for presence of beneﬁts of- 1
ﬁce in previous year
Legal ofﬁce ............................... Binary variable for presence of legal of- 1
ﬁce in previous year
Formalization scale ................. Scale (1–5) marking presence of job lad- 1
ders, written job descriptions, salary
classiﬁcation system, nonunion griev-
ance procedure, and performance evalu-
ations in previous year
Labor market factors:
Unemployment ......................... Regional unemployment rate in previous 2
year
Change in unemployment ...... Change in regional unemployment 2
Feminization ............................ Industry feminization in previous year 1
Change in feminization ........... Change in industry feminization 1
Legal and press attention:
Litigation .................................. Federal decisions in maternity leave cases 1
(three-year moving average)
Press coverage .......................... New York Times articles on maternity 1
leave (three-year moving average)
Policy environment:
1955–73 ..................................... Reference period
1974–79 ..................................... Period following EEOC guidelines 1
1980–85 ..................................... Period following Pregnancy Discrimina- (none)
tion Act
California .................................. Reference states are New Jersey and (none)
Virginia
1974–79 ................................. Additional effects of period following (none)
EEOC guidelines, in California
1980–85 ................................. Period following California’s afﬁrmative 1
action law
Note.—Variables are subject to change over time. Reference industries include nonproﬁt organiza-
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noted. To measure establishment size, we requested ﬁgures on the number
of employees in 1985, 1975, 1965, and 1955. We also asked about years
in which unusual gains or losses occurred. Annual size ﬁgures were inter-
polated from these responses and logged for use in the models. To measure
age, we collected information on the founding date of each organization.
We measure ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills with industry variables. Previous studies
show that among the industries in our sample, chemicals, electrical ma-
chinery, and machinery manufacturing have high levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). We include these three indus-
tries in core manufacturing. We also include banking and government
variables to test the hypotheses that concern for long-term employment
and vulnerability to state and public pressures increase adoptions of ma-
ternity leave. We use a binary variable that represents the presence of a
union contract. To measure formalization, we include a scale comprised
of ﬁve internal labor market (ILM) practices: job ladder, written job de-
scription, salary classiﬁcation, nonunion grievance procedure, and formal
performance evaluation. We measure the presence of legal, personnel, and
beneﬁts ofﬁces with binary variables.
We supplement the survey data with publicly available data on labor
market characteristics. To measure the proportion female in each indus-
try, we use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employ-
ment Statistics (CES) Survey, which provides annual ﬁgures on female
employment at the two-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) level. CES
is the only source of labor force data that covers feminization before 1964,
and it provides a more detailed industry breakdown than the other possi-
ble sources, such as the early Current Population Survey and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission annual reports. For a few indus-
tries, we estimated ﬁgures for several missing years using simple linear
regression.3 Most missing data were from 1955–57, when there was little
annual change in female labor force participation. In addition to propor-
tion female, we use a lagged change score. While we would like to include
an establishment-level measure of feminization as well, questions on
workforce composition were deleted from the survey instrument after a
pretest showed a high rate of refusals for questions about female employ-
ment.
To measure unemployment, we use regional unemployment rates calcu-
lated from the Current Population Survey. We use regional data rather
3 The estimated years are 1955–57 (chemicals, publishing); 1955–58 (electrical, ma-
chinery, hospitals, retail trade); 1955–62 (banks, transportation, government); and
1955–71 (nonproﬁt organizations).
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than state-leveldata, because thesedata areavailablefor theentireperiod.
We use both the unemployment rate and a change score.
To measure press attention, we use a lagged three-year average of the
number of New York Times articles dealing with maternity leave. The
New York Times is cataloged in the New York Times Index and in the
Lexis-Nexis service. These sources made identifying and counting mater-
nity leave articles feasible, whereas other papers and magazines are not
well indexed for the entire period covered by our study. We also estimated
models using a lagged annual count of articles, and the results were sub-
stantially similar.
To measure litigation activity, we use a lagged three-year average of
the number of federal court decisions in cases dealing with maternity
leave. We gathered annual count data from the Lexis legal research ser-
vice, using the GENFED, NEWER libraries to search all federal cases
since 1944. We also collected annual counts of decisions in cases related
to pregnancy discrimination. We estimated models using a lagged count
of maternity leave cases, a lagged count of maternity leave and pregnancy
discrimination cases, a lagged count of pregnancy discrimination cases,
and a three-year average of pregnancy discrimination cases. Results were
substantially similar, hence, we report models that use the lagged three-
year average of maternity leave cases.
To measure the effects of public policies, we include binary variables
for the periods 1974–79 and 1980–85 (with 1955–73 omitted), a binary
variable for operationin California,and aninteractionbetween California
and each period variable. We lag the periods one year, beginning each in
the January following the ﬁrst full year of operation of the new policy.
We expect that the contentious legal environment, prompted by changes
in the EEOC guidelines, will increase adoption among all employers be-
tween 1974 and 1979. We also hypothesize that the federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which required equal treatment of pregnancy and
other disabilities, will not increase the adoption of formal maternity leave
policies in New Jersey and Virginia in the period 1980–85. We expect that
California’s maternity leave requirement, added to its state fair employ-
ment law late in 1978, will increase adoptions in that state be-
tween 1980 and 1985. Thus, we expect that, with 1955–73 as the reference
period, the period 1974–79 will have a positive effect, and the period
1980–85 will have little or no effect. We expect to ﬁnd that California
was no different from New Jersey and Virginia before 1980 and thus do
not expect to see signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for California or for California,
1974–79. However, we expect the interaction of California with 1980–85
to have a positive effect as a consequence of the state’s maternity leave
law.
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Estimation
We use discrete event-history methods because we do not know the exact
timing of adoption within the spells and because we have many “tied”
events, that is, years in which multiple employers adopt maternity leaves
(Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice 1980; Allison 1995, pp. 220–22). In particular,
we employ discrete models where the hazard (instantaneous risk) at time
t for an organization with characteristics i is
h(t|Xi) 5 h0(t)(X¢ ib).
Here, h0(t) is a baseline hazard function describing the risk for organiza-
tions with baseline characteristics X 5 0, and the exponentiate (X¢ i b)i s
a proportionate increase or reduction in risk associated with characteris-
tics Xi.
Because the transformed data set contains annual spells, the hazard
of adoption in each year is equivalent to Pit, the conditional probability
that the event occurs to organization i in year t, given that it has not
already occurred. We model the complementary log-log transformation
of the survival function (1 2 Pit) on the covariates, speciﬁed for that
time:4
log[2log(1 2 Pit)] 5 a(t) 1 b¢Xit.
The coefﬁcients estimated by this procedure have a proportional hazards,
or relative risk, interpretation. We estimatedthe models using a maximum
likelihood method,carriedout with theGENMODprocedurein thestatis-
tical program SAS.
We present three nested models predicting maternity leave adoption.
First, we examine the effects of organizational and labor market variables.
Second, we add variables representing maternity leave litigation and press
coverage. Third, we add variables representing changes in the legal envi-
ronment. In models not reported here, we added a time trend to rule out
the possibility that the legal regime variables are picking up a simple secu-
lar change. They are not.
FINDINGS
We ﬁnd little support for the feminization and legal sanction hypotheses
and strong support for neoinstitutional hypotheses. First, employers re-
sponded to press coverage of changes in maternity leave law. Second, in
4 The complementary log-log transformation takes a variable with the values between
0 and 1 and changes it to a continuous value that ranges from minus inﬁnity to plus
inﬁnity (Allison 1996, p. 216).
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the contentious legal environment that followed the EEOC guidelines,
employers adopted maternity leave in large numbers; whereas after the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act conﬁrmed the legal standing of the EEOC
position, employers were less likely to adopt maternity leave. We conclude
that the contested administrative ruling caused susceptible employers to
change their practices and that the congressional statute thus had no net
effect. This supports our hypothesis about the paradoxical power of puta-
tively weak administrative rulings and undermines the legal sanction hy-
pothesis about the relative power of congressional statutes. Another test
of the legal sanction hypothesis also fails: maternity leave litigation does
not show a signiﬁcant effect on employer policies. Our third ﬁnding about
the legal environment is that California’s afﬁrmative action law was more
effective than the federal equal protection law, as expected. In fully speci-
ﬁed models, we found no support for the feminization thesis: industry-
level feminization, and change in feminization, failed to show signiﬁcant
effects.
Our most striking ﬁndings can be seen by comparing models 1, 2, and
3 in table 2. To test the feminization hypothesis, we examine the sex com-
position of the workforce at the industry level. Whereas in model 1, both
feminization and change in feminization showed signiﬁcant effects, in
models 2 and 3, in which we control for press coverage of maternity leave
laws and for the laws themselves, the feminization measures are no longer
signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings support cross-sectional studies showing that
feminization has little effect on maternity leave (Ingram and Simons 1995;
Glass and Fujimoto 1995). To be sure, female workforce participation was
rising in the 1970s when maternity leave policies began to diffuse, but
it appears that legal shifts better predict organizational change. Because
maternity leave was covered under sex discrimination law, an industry’s
particular sex composition is relatively unimportant as a predictor of
adoption. It appears that employers adopted maternity leave not to com-
pete for women workers so much as to comply with the law. This can
be seen, indirectly, in ﬁgure 2—few employers, even those in feminized
industries offered maternity leave before the law changed. It was not
workforce feminization per se that spawned maternity leave policies.
We test the legal sanction hypothesis by comparing the effects of the
PDA to those of the EEOC guidelines, and as noted above, the PDA did
not show a net effect. We conclude that the EEOC guidelines had led
employers who were attentive to thelaw to change their practices. We also
test the legal sanction hypothesis by looking at maternity leave litigation
counts. The litigation variable does show a positive effect in the presence
of controls (in a model identical to model 2 but without the press count
variable), but the press count variable washes that effect out. This is not
surprising, for we saw the conjunction of the peak of press coverage (ﬁg.
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TABLE 2
Estimates of the Adoption of Maternity Leave
Model
Organizational With Press
and Labor and Litigation With Legal
Market Variables Variables Periods
(1) (2) (3)
Log employment ....................... .128* (.063) .146* (.064) .146* (.064)
Age ............................................. 2.004* (.002) 2.004* (.002) 2.004* (.002)
Banking ..................................... 1.231** (.287) 1.254** (.287) 1.197** (.289)
Core manufacturing ................. 1.200** (.271) 1.138** (.269) 1.036** (.271)
Government agencies ............... .620* (.259) .639* (.258) .622* (.260)
Unionized ................................... .196 (.228) .146 (.230) .049 (.236)
Personnel ofﬁce ......................... .182 (.218) .163 (.216) .193 (.214)
Beneﬁts ofﬁce ............................ .545* (.212) .513* (.212) .554* (.218)
Legal ofﬁce ................................ 2.039 (.242) .021 (.245) .069 (.248)
Formalization scale .................. .080 (.063) .062 (.064) .058 (.064)
Unemployment .......................... .265** (.056) .208** (.069) .050 (0.83)
Change in unemployment ....... 2.085 (.075) 2.001 (.079) 2.060 (.085)
Feminization ............................. .014* (.006) .012 (.006) .009 (.006)
Change in feminization ............ 8.669* (3.496) 7.247 (3.798) 6.871 (4.084)
Maternity leave:
Litigation ............................... 2.037 (.019) 2.009 (.028)
Press coverage ....................... .084** (.029) 2.006 (.044)
1974–79 .................................. 1.744** (.509)
1980–85 .................................. .419 (.630)
California ................................... .227 (.304)
1974–79 .................................. 2.237 (.392)
1980–85 .................................. 1.233* (.512)
Constant ..................................... 27.331** (.604) 27.152** (.639) 26.273** (.666)
Deviance .................................... 1,201.42 1,185.99 1,162.09
df ................................................. 4,711 4,709 4,704
Note.—SEs are in parentheses.
* P , .05.
** P , .01.
1) and the rapid expansion of corporate maternity leave policies (ﬁg. 2) in
the mid-1970s. The volume of litigation (see ﬁg. 4) rose when the legal
standing of the EEOC position was conﬁrmed by the PDA and remained
high during the early 1980s. The spread of maternity leave slowed in this
period. The results suggest that employers respond not to the objective
risk of being sued but to press coverage that makes them aware of new
legal standards.
After evaluating the indirect effects of legal changes, via press coverage,
in model 2, we evaluate the direct effects of legal changes in model 3.
With other factors controlled, the annual hazard of adopting maternity
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leave is about 5.8 times higher in the period 1974–79 than in the period
1955–73. This suggests that the EEOC guidelines had a strong positive
effect on the adoption of maternity leave. However, with full controls in
the model, the coefﬁcient for 1980–85 is small and nonsigniﬁcant. This
suggests that after the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 was passed,
employers were no more likely to add maternity leave policies than they
had been in the period 1955–73.
We introduce the variable California and interact it with the two latter
periods to determine whether California’s 1978 maternity leave law had
a net effect on adoption. California (which captures the period 1955–73)
andCalifornia, 1974–79,show small and nonsigniﬁcant effects,suggesting
thatbefore 1980s,California employers were nodifferentfrom New Jersey
and Virginia employers. However, California, 1980–85, shows a large and
signiﬁcant effect, which suggests that the 1978 afﬁrmative action law had
an impact. While New Jersey and Virginia employers were no more likely
to adopt maternity leave in 1980–85 than they had been in 1955–73, Cali-
fornia employers who had not already done so were about ﬁve times as
likely to adopt leaves. To test whether California was different from both
other states, we introduced a parallel set of period interactions for New
Jersey (in a model not reported here). The results—a signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcient for California, 1980–85, and an insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for
New Jersey, 1980–85—show that California was unique.5
In sum,models 2and 3measure shiftsin thelegal environment in differ-
ent ways. In model 2, we observe the effects of legal changes as mediated
by press coverage. In model 3, we observe the effects of legal changes
directly, with measures that capture each state-by-period policy environ-
ment. We do not expect to ﬁnd that all measures are signiﬁcant when
included together. Press coverage does not show a signiﬁcant effect in
model 3, and we conclude that this is because the state-by-period interac-
tions better capture the substantial variety in the law than does the press
coverage variable.
Next, we turn to control variables. As expected, large employers are
more likely to create maternity leave programs and older employers are
5 After 1978,the combination of thePregnancyDisability Actand state laws on tempo-
rary disability insurance meant that medium and large employers in both California
and New Jersey were required to cover pregnancy in their disability programs (Cali-
fornia Unemployment Insurance Code 2626 [1998], New Jersey Statutes 43:21–29
[1991]). Women in these states received some pay during their pregnancy-related ab-
sences, but these laws did not require job-guaranteed leaves per se. If state disability
laws had been crucial to the spread of maternity leave, we would have seen California
and New Jersey employers behave differently than Virginia employers. New Jersey
employers did not jump to add formal leave policies after the PDA, pointing to the
importance of California’s afﬁrmative action law.
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less likely to do so. We speculated that industries that place a premium
on employment continuity—including core manufacturing (chemicals,
electrical machinery, and machinery) and ﬁnance—would be more likely
to adopt maternity leave. We ﬁnd consistent positive effects of location
in these sectors.
We predicted that government agencies and nonproﬁt organizations
would be quick to comply with new Civil Rights laws. While nonproﬁts
were no different from organizations in the reference industries, and hence
are included in the reference category in reported models, government
agencies were signiﬁcantly different.
We test the industrial relations hypotheses that unions ﬁght for fringe
beneﬁts and that feminized unions ﬁght for maternity leave. We found
that unionized employers were not more likely to adopt maternity leave,
and in results not reported here, we found that feminized, unionized em-
ployers were not more likely to do so either. However, we do not consider
these ﬁndings to be deﬁnitive, because the industry variables may be cap-
turing the effects of unions. The failure of the unionization measures may
also be the result of a process that has been described by Selznick (1969),
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986), and Swenson (1992), whereby
nonunion ﬁrms copy the industrial relations systems of their unionized
peers.
We predicted that employers with personnel, legal, and beneﬁts ofﬁces
would be more likely to adopt maternity leave policies. The presence of
a beneﬁts ofﬁce increases the annual risk by about 70%. Personnel and
legal ofﬁces show no effects, apparently because the beneﬁts profession
led the charge to create maternity policies. In a search of professional
journal indexes, we found that beneﬁts journals carried 55 articles on ma-
ternity leave between 1970 and 1984—more than personnel, labor law,
and executive management journals combined. The formalization scale
shows positive, but nonsigniﬁcant, effects in each model. It appears that
having aprofessional within the organization to advocate maternity leave,
in the personof abeneﬁts manager, is moreimportant than having formal-
ized personnel functions.
Economists expect that when unemployment is low in an industry, em-
ployers will offer beneﬁts, such as maternity leave, to attract new workers
and bind incumbents to the ﬁrm. Models 1 and 2 suggest, on the contrary,
that when unemployment is high, employers adopt maternity leave. How-
ever, model 3, with legal periods controlled, suggests that this relationship
is spurious. The oil crisis of the mid-1970s produced high unemployment,
and this happened to coincide with the implementation of the EEOC rul-
ing. When we control for this period, the unexpected positive effect of
unemployment disappears.
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CONCLUSION
Why did so many American employers create maternity leave programs
in the 1970s and 1980s, well before passage of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993? Politicians, business leaders, and scholars have
pointed to the growing presence of women in the workforce. We argue
that sex discrimination law was the driving force. As federal agencies and
the courts elaborated the deﬁnition of sex discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act, employers addedmaternity leave policies to move into compli-
ance.
We build on an insight from neoinstitutional theory—that structural
weaknesses donot prevent theU.S. state from shapingemployer practices.
Previous studies have explored the effects of Congress’s use of ambiguous
language in employment law. The ambiguity of the law can lead employ-
ers, uncertain what exactly is required of them, to create elaborate compli-
ance measures. Legal ambiguity can thus lead to strong corporate re-
sponse.We haveexamined the consequences ofanother seemingweakness
of the federal state, the separation of powers. The constitutional separa-
tion of powers allows all three branches of government to make law, but
it also invites private parties to contest the law. To assess the effects of
this legal openness on employer compliance, we compare the most vulner-
able kind of law with the least vulnerable kind of law. Administrative
law is weakest because it can be challenged by case law, which can, in
turn, be overruled by legislation. In consequence, congressional acts ap-
pear to be more stable and powerful than administrative rulings. History
has provided us with an opportunity to test this idea against a competing
idea—that administrative rulings can be effective precisely because their
vulnerability invites legal challenges, which can serve to promulgate
them.
Perhaps our most surprising ﬁnding is that an embattled administrative
ruling of uncertain legal standing caused large numbers of employers to
adopt maternity leave policies. The EEOC’s 1972 Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation because of Sex were challenged by employers who argued that the
agency had no authority to extend sex discrimination law to cover preg-
nancy. Employers won this battle in the Supreme Court, yet, in the mean-
time, press coverage of their challenge helped to make other employers
aware of the law. By the time Congress reversed the Supreme Court and
codiﬁed the EEOC position in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
those employers who were susceptible to legal pressure had already
changed their policies. In brief, legal challenges to an administrative rul-
ing led employers to comply with the ruling. We would expect to ﬁnd
the same process at work in other realms of business regulation, because
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administrators and judges interpret the law in realms as diverse as anti-
trust and occupational safety, and because employers frequently use the
courts to challenge those interpretations. Given the administrative
branch’s reluctance to monitor each and every workplace, organizations
are likely to learn about new legal standards through press coverage of
litigation. Minor administrative rulings can have large effects, then, even
when they are eventually overturned by judges (see McCann 1994, 1998).
We ﬁnd little evidence that employers adopted maternity leave in re-
sponse to the objective risk of legal sanction. First, they were not more
likely to comply with an uncontested congressional statute than with an
embattled administrative guideline. Second, they were not sensitive to the
number of federal maternity leave lawsuits. This does not mean that the
law did not matter; it means that the law affected employer practice by
creating a social standard and not simply by creating a calculable risk.
The behaviorist assumptionsunderlying the law-and-economics approach
suggest that agents make objective evaluations of the risk of sanction by
observing what the state is doing. The sociological assumptions underly-
ing both the neoinstitutional (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer 1994; Scott
1995) and the network (White 1981; Granovetter 1985) approaches sug-
gest that agents monitor the behavior of their peers. In this case, our
ﬁndings suggest, their lookouts were beneﬁts professionals who tracked
emerging norms in the organizational ﬁeld. Employers behaved as
social actors, copying the behavior of others, rather than as rational cal-
culators, making objective assessments of the risks associated with non-
compliance.
In addition to examining the efﬁcacy of administrative law, we compare
the two kinds of Civil Rights law that govern employment: equal opportu-
nity law and afﬁrmative action law. We make a critical comparison be-
tween the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and California’s
Fair Housing and Employment law, passed in the same year. The federal
law requires employers who offer medical disability leaves to cover mater-
nity; the California law requires employers to allow maternity leaves even
if they do not offer medical disability leaves. We compare employers in
New Jersey and Virginia, subject only to the federal equal opportunity
law, to those in California, subject to the afﬁrmative action law. Califor-
nia’s afﬁrmative action law has a signiﬁcant net effect, observable in both
the over-time plot and the event-history analysis. We expect the ﬁnding
that afﬁrmative action laws are more effective in changing employer prac-
tices to hold up in other settings, and indeed early labor market studies
support this idea (Leonard 1984).
Some argue that afﬁrmative action laws are not politically viable, and
others argue that they can do more harm than good. In light of the effec-
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tiveness of these policies, these fears are exaggerated. First, while political
backlash has led some states to curtail afﬁrmative action in higher educa-
tion, common afﬁrmative action practices in employment, such as recruit-
ing and mentoring programs for women and minorities, remain popular
with the public (Steeh and Krysan 1996, p. 132; Taylor 1995). Moreover,
the newest afﬁrmative action law—the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, which requires that employers accommodate the disabled—also
enjoys widespread support. Second, while some fear that “special treat-
ment” laws can harm the intended beneﬁciaries, our ﬁndings suggest that
group-speciﬁc policies, functioning in the context of equal opportunity
law, can make the workplace more hospitable for women. Recent evi-
dence shows that paid maternity and parental leaves—expensive pro-
grams beneﬁting primarily women workers—have not limited women’s
employment in Europe (Ruhm and Teague 1997, pp. 147–48).
Public policy played an important role in the spread of maternity leave
programs during the 1970s and 1980s, but it left little trace in the minds
of managers, politicians, and scholars. These observers may discount the
role of policy because the Supreme Court overturned the key law, but the
fact that the EEOC guidelines were overturned does not mean that they
did not have effects. They had powerful effects. High-proﬁle legal chal-
lenges by employers appear to have ampliﬁed those effects, rather than
to have dampened them.
The case we examine is typical in many ways. Legislation is just the
beginning of lawmaking in the federal system. It is typical that the crucial
policy change emerged when the administrative branch sought to inter-
pret congressional intent (Lempert and Sanders 1986; Suchman and Edel-
man 1996). It is typical that affected parties challenged that interpretation
(Burstein and Monaghan 1986; Burstein and Pitchford 1990). It is typical
that professionals lobbied executives to comply with the new law even
before legal challenges had been resolved (Edelman et al. 1992; Sutton
and Dobbin 1996). And it is typical that a quarter century hence, politi-
cians and business leaders appear to have forgotten this episode (Dobbin
and Sutton 1998).
Commentators argue that employers created maternity leave policies
in response to a change in the labor market, namely feminization. This
claim reinforces the idea that, in the United States, the market is powerful
and the state is not. That idea becomes self-fulﬁlling when even the advo-
cates of social change come to believe it. We view the pattern we have
documented, of a public policy inducing new business practices and then
being forgotten, as evidence of the remarkable rhetorical power of the
market in the United States. The inclination to see social practices as
driven by market mechanisms, and to believe that practices created by
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other means are artiﬁcial and illegitimate appears to have blinded many to
the role of the state in improving opportunities for disadvantaged groups.
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